REPORT Public reporting burder for this collection of information is estibated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. 
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Preface
The role of the military has undergone numerous changes over the past ten years. As a result, our military services are now exposing young officers to joint operations earlier in their careers through joint training exercises and real world Joint Task Force (JTF) operations, such as, Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. These types of joint operations are likely to continue and increase in the future. Therefore, I believe it is essential that our services provide their junior officers with Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) that provides a basic understanding of joint operations and sister services' capabilities.
Junior officer joint education is not a revolutionary idea -it is mandated by the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) in his Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). The OPMEP requires our services to conduct joint education at every level of an officer's career.
Through my personal experience as a student of both the Army and Air Force intermediate level colleges, the military is extremely focused on joint education at the field grade level, but some of our services have lost sight of the CJCS's joint education requirements at the junior officer level.
Assuming we continue to expose junior officers to joint operations as discussed above, our services must educate their junior officers in basic joint matters. Currently, the military does itself a disservice by not seriously considering joint education until officers are promoted to 
Abstract
This research examines joint education at the primary education levels (pay grades 01-03) within our four military services by using the CJCS's OPMEP as the baseline document. It first provides an understanding of the CJCS's joint education requirements at the primary education level and then reviews the actual need for that education by examining related studies, position papers or articles from key leaders within the upper echelon of the military education community. The research uncovered few comments that failed to support the need for some type of joint education at the primary/junior officer education level. Finally, the research discusses if or how the services are providing Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) at their primary level schools and whether that joint education supports the requirements of the OPMEP and the proposals provided in a recent JPME 2010 Study --Requirements Team Report.
With our strategic environment constantly changing, our strategic education plans must also change.
1 Based on our increased usage of JTFs over the past ten years, junior officers may be direct participants in joint operations, or serve on JTF staffs, before the end of their first decade of service. To prepare for that uncertain future, at a minimum, we must educate our junior officers beyond the context of their own branch of service or warfare specialty by, integrating the OPMEP's suggested joint topics into the curricula of the services' primary level institutions. In order to convince the services to shift some of their attention on joint education at the primary level, the directives must come from the CJCS. The Department of Defense (DOD)
Reorganization Act of 1986, commonly known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, assigned the vi responsibility for joint doctrine and education development to the CJCS. 2 This act gives the Chairman authority to dictate significant joint education reforms throughout the services as necessary.
Based on the research provided in this study, the United States Army and Marine Corps are the only services that are either in the developmental phase or possess an existing JPME program for the primary education level.
3
Based on sources within Air University and the Naval Education and Training Command, the United States Air Force and Navy are not providing their junior officers with formal joint education that is either in accordance with the OPMEP or preparing junior officers for JTF duties. 4 While minimum joint matters are discussed throughout their curricula, no formal joint education programs exist at their primary level institutions.
5
At the conclusion of this study, the reader will agree that joint education at the primary level will ultimately improve interservice cooperation, strengthen our warfighting capability, and prepare junior officers for the future joint environment. The author will provide this study to the Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J-7, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. to contribute towards efforts to reform JPME in support of the CJCS's vision and the needs of our nine geographic and functional Commanders in Chief (CINC). Based on the findings in this study, the author recommends that J7 reemphasize joint education at the primary level and continue to require each service to review and report on their existing programs and develop corrective actions as deemed necessary by each service chief. As stated earlier, the Goldwater-Nichols Act assigned the responsibility for joint education to the CJCS. 6 The Act gave the CJCS the mission of formulating military education policy with the desired end state of developing military officers competent in joint matters. 7 The Chairman mandates integration of joint education in Professional Military Education (PME) institutions through his OPMEP. This policy requires the services to conduct joint education at every level of an officer's career. Other than providing guidance and areas of interest for each level of education, the OPMEP does not dictate to the services how to teach the suggested joint topics.
This research paper emphasizes the lack of JPME within our four services' primary education levels. Currently, the bulk of our services are waiting for their officers to be promoted The author does not recommend joint education at the precommissioning level, but does see joint education at the primary level as an opportunity to create well rounded military professionals that possess strong basic understandings of joint operation concepts and are prepared for a challenging future.
As you will see in chapter 3, several joint education studies and senior leaders within the military's education community support the need for this additional joint education training at the primary level. For example, in a recent JPME study, 30 percent of the senior military leaders interviewed stated that joint education, specifically JTF related education, does not begin early enough in an officer's career. 10 This JPME study implies that the services are not adequately supporting the intent of the OPMEP as it pertains to joint education at the primary level.
However, it does specifically point out that the OPMEP, previously known as the Military Education Planning Document (MEPD), "is relatively new and the four services may be in the process of implementing the education."
11
Through the author's personal experience as a student of both the Army and Air Force intermediate level colleges and the research collected for this study, there is no doubt that the military is extremely focused on joint education at the senior officer level. However, this study raises serious concerns about the lack of junior JPME within some of our services. This does not support the CJCS's OPMEP, which established objectives, philosophies and policies that continue to guide the JPME process throughout the DOD. These initial policies established the Chairman's guidance that joint education is important to all officers--not just seniors. Today's OPMEP establishes the minimum standards for service compliance. Both documents address military education at the precommissioning and primary levels, but not all services have developed programs.
This research paper provides a supported argument that it's time to invest in our joint future by educating junior officers in joint matters. In order to prepare our junior officers for a challenging joint future, "predominately involving joint operations," 12 primary level joint education must receive additional emphasis in our JPME framework. At the conclusion, the reader will agree that joint education at the primary level will ultimately improve interservice cooperation, strengthen our warfighting capability, and at a minimum, prepare junior officers for that challenging joint future.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to examine joint military education at the primary level (pay grades O1-O3) within our four military services to determine compliance with the CJCS's OPMEP regarding joint training at that same level. As stated earlier, the goal is to provide the Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J-7, Joint Staff, Washington D.C.
with additional information to contribute toward his staff's ongoing effort to refine the JPME programs in support of the Chairman's "Force 2010" visions.
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Method and Procedures
The methodology followed a three tiered approach. The first step was to thoroughly identify the junior officer education requirements established in the OPMEP and identify evidence that either supports or disagrees with the need for joint education at the primary level. The second step involved determining the content of joint education within our four services' junior officer education programs. The major educational commands for each service were used as the 5 primary resources for this information. The final step involved comparing the content of the services' primary level joint education programs with the broad OPMEP requirements and the JPME "…the primary function of the Services to provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform a role," 6 the CJCS simply gave them a requirement to include JPME at every education level.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act brought about the following JPME changes:
"establishment of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principle advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense on all military issues including PME; defined joint matters for educational and other purposes as relating to the integration of forces; created a JSO career field; mandated maintaining 'rigorous standards' at JPME institutions; and designated a PME focal point in the Vice Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff."
7
The J7 is also dual hatted as the Deputy Director, Joint Staff, for Military Education and oversees the Military Education Division.
The reforms created by the Goldwater-Nichols Act were not the only reason for the emergence of this joint culture, but they did facilitate its growth. The recent 5 th Anniversary
Edition of the Joint Force Quarterly points out that "joint culture will continue to grow and that its impacts on the individual services are not yet fully known." 8 Significant to this study, LTG (Ret.) Graves stated, "we will continue to face additional JPME challenges and it is vital that our young officers recall that the Armed Forces successfully adapted the new realities under title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act." 9 In 1990, the CJCS offered more defined and updated guidance in its MEPD. It stated, "In concert with the introduction to one's own service, all students should receive an overview of the joint arena, its history and purpose, to commence the process of thinking from a joint perspective." 10 However, the JCS backed off from issuing specific learning objectives that required the services to develop primary level joint curriculum based on a common framework.
8
As programs for joint education evolved, the Joint Staff produced the Chairman's OPMEP.
The OPMEP defines the CJCS objectives and policies regarding the schools, colleges, and other educational institutions making up the military's PME system. It states that the "intent of the PME process is to raise the level of proficiency among the Armed Forces' officer corps and support the educational requirements of the CJCS, the Services, the Combatant Commanders, and other DOD agencies." 12 The OPMEP, a strategic level document, purposely offers broad guidance and does not dictate curriculum to service chiefs. It informs them of the CJCS's vision, "JPME will play an extremely important role in building the type of Armed Forces outlined in a concept under development, Joint Vision 2010."
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The OPMEP PME framework is divided into five distinct phases of an officer's career development: precommissioning, primary, intermediate, senior, and General/flag Officer. The "primary level", (the focus of this study,) spans the ranks of officer pay grades O1 through O3.
This type of education is found in the services' basic and advanced career courses, warfare specialty schools or, depending on the service, other special primary level PME courses. This level focuses on the officers' service values, warfare specialty or branch specific operations, leadership, and staff skills. The OPMEP's PME framework clearly identifies an officer's education as a career long effort.
When the OPMEP discusses JPME, it refers to that portion of the basic PME that focuses on the instruction of "joint" matters. According to the OPMEP, joint emphasis at the primary level should simply be "joint awareness". It recommends the following areas of focus: "fundamental concepts of a Joint Task Force Organization, relation between joint and service doctrine, integration of joint and Services' systems supporting the tactical battlespace, joint and Services'
weapon-systems integration, and Services' contributions to joint warfighting." 14 It also identifies the primary level of education as the bridge between the tactical and operational levels of war.
With no mention of a specific rank, the OPMEP identifies the need to provide all officers with a basic understanding of joint warfare. Reviewing the OPMEP, this author understands the CJCS intent as developing officers who will improve the overall effectiveness of joint forces' "Developing and educating officers in the integrated employment of these capabilities, joint or combined, should not serve to diminish core service capabilities. PME should not become too joint. Calls for substantial amounts of joint education down to the precommissioning level, among other initiatives, could rapidly lead to that point."
15
The author of this study does not recommend joint education at the precommissioning level, but does see joint education at the primary level as an opportunity to create well rounded military professionals that are prepared for a challenging joint future involving JTFs.
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The OPMEP directs the services to develop junior officers who have a "basic understanding of how battlespace systems support the tactical level of war and how warfare at the particular service's tactical level of war is linked to the joint operational level of war." 16 Another specific directive within the OPMEP is for "each service to provide a report to the CJCS on the joint educational programs at the precommissioning and primary levels." This chapter presents a thorough review of related joint education studies and provides the historical framework that will enable the reader to understand the importance of this education issue. It also allows us to review the concerns and comments of significant leaders throughout the military education community. This chapter proves that the requirement for joint military education is not something that was recently developed --it has been around for over fifty years.
The military's concern for jointness can be traced back to World War II. Planning and execution of joint operations during that war were often hampered by a lack of common doctrine and officers' poor knowledge of the other services' capabilities. 1 As a consequence, in 1947, the JCS appointed the Richardson Committee to examine postwar needs in the entire educational system and determine how jointness could be integrated into the curricula. This study, General
Plan for Postwar Joint Education of the Armed Forces, considered introducing joint education at the service academy level. 2 This significant idea is directly related to this study because senior 12 JCS leadership recognized that early education in joint matters was important to joint readiness.
Unfortunately, there were no other detailed reasons provided. This idea never materialized because the panel considered it too costly. However, the panel was not too concerned because they concluded that young officers would "receive indirect education in joint matters through contacts and associations, and through the dissemination downward of the formal education presented at higher levels."
3 While a few minor education studies existed between 1955 and 1970, nearly forty years past before the question of expanding joint education down to the lower levels was seriously reconsidered. In 1982, former CJCS, General David Jones, led an internal study that was meant to improve the JCS system. It did not specifically address joint education at the primary level, but it did conclude that officers assigned to joint duty were not sufficiently educated and needed more experience. This finding led to the creation of the first JPMEPD in 1984.
"As the U.S. faced numerous failures in joint level operations such as the 1980 Iranian rescue attempt, the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, and congressional dissatisfaction with the 1983 Grenada Operation, key civilian and military leaders were placing the blame on the lack of sufficient joint education." 4 These and many other circumstances led to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act that mandated joint education reform. 5 The education reforms required under the Goldwater-Nichols Act led to the creation of two major study groups. Both groups examined the question of when joint education should begin in order to develop capable joint specialty officers.
The first was the JCS-appointed Dougherty Board that reported its findings in 1987. This report concluded that the nation would be "…best served by the widest possible cultivation of joint perspectives in military officers," 6 and that joint education should not be limited to those serving in joint assignments. The report went on to say that "…officers should be introduced to joint matters at the earliest possible level, but joint instruction should not come at the expense of The panel also sought to determine how the overall professional military education system could produce an officer competent in joint matters. 9 This group basically concluded the same thing as the Dougherty Board that the appropriate point for an officer to begin a serious study of jointness was at the intermediate level of schooling. However, Congressman Skelton proposed that "future, smaller, more capable joint forces demand joint training at the lowest possible levels. 10 "
The board recognized that some joint education should begin as early as the precommissioning level, but felt that education at the lower levels "..should not be to teach an in-depth knowledge of joint operations or to prepare perspective officers for joint duty." 11 The Skelton Commission envisioned four goals:
"…expanding branch or warfare specialty training that officers receive in the first few years of commissioned service to include joint matters; allowing officers to understand the role their unit plays in the overall joint effort; helping officers understand how each service supports the missions of the other services; and encouragement of self study to develop a broader understanding of warfare concepts."
12
The Skelton Commission's recommendations were studied by the CJCS and ultimately incorporated into the 1990 MEPD discussed in Chapter 2 of this study. The services were free to liberally interpret the broadly worded MEPD guidance and reshape or shape their primary programs. In the following years, the services' Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs, and primary institutions began approaching joint education from widely different perspectives.
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Defining JPME requirements and identifying an educational process/system that will prepare officers for current and future challenges is a task that began to emerge in the mid 1990s.
One of the first documents to support this theme was Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010). 14 None of the young officers on my staff understood the full spectrum of the Atlantic Command's strategic responsibilities within Haiti or it's authority over the USSPTGRP. Some young officers did not even understand the responsibilities and functions of the various joint staff sections. Their lack of basic knowledge was surprising, but understandable, because as a fairly new Major, I was also receiving on-the-job joint training. Although my staff and I had a lack of joint education prior to assuming our duties, the J4's mission was not seriously affected, but the lack of education produced a wealth of growing pains.
My largest staff problem, while performing duties as the J4, that can be associated to inadequate joint education at the primary level, was the staff's inability to successfully coordinate with other key staff functions and outside agencies. The J4's, at this particular time, was the transportation of resources in and out of the country by way of sea and air. If I was not directly involved in the coordination of problem solving, the transportation of resources was delayed.
Inbound delays that were the result of poor staffing occurred three times within my six-month tour --one by sea and two by air. Unfortunately, when inbound shipments were delayed, significant in country operational missions were also delayed and service men and women didn't receive fresh fruits, vegetables, or other perishables. Delays while living in the austere environment of Haiti quickly became serious support issues.
The junior officers assigned to the J4 staff did not understand the capabilities and responsibilities of the Atlantic Command's joint staff functions in resolving problems.
Additionally, the majority of the junior officers did not understand the responsibilities of U.S.
TRANSCOM, a supporting CINC for U.S. Atlantic Command. Since our mission was predominately transportation oriented, this was a significant education shortfall among the group of young officers. They also didn't understand the role of the U.S. Embassy or other government or non-government organizations operating in Haiti. The lack of joint education within this young staff glued me to the office for decision making and guidance. Due to the questionable abilities of the young staff, on most occasions, members of the Atlantic Command's J4 staff (in Norfolk, VA) talked only to myself (USSPTGRP J4.) This contributed to the delay of critical staff actions. In most cases, the issues exceeded the abilities of the young officer involved. As you will see, the military's concern for joint education at the junior levels continued well after my experiences in Haiti.
In January 1998 the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, hosted a two-day conference titled, "Professional Military Education for the 21 st Century Warrior." An impressive group of top ranking legislators, academicians, historians, and military education community leaders came to the conference to discuss the current status and future of PME and JPME.
According to the published conference proceedings, a very wide range of PME topics were discussed by all quests. Additionally, there were many discussions about JPME and the criticality of adequate joint education at the intermediate and senior levels. On a few occasions, there were discussions regarding the importance of joint education at the precommissioning level. However, for reasons unknown, there seemed to be no discussion about joint education at the primary level. Once again, senior leaders took time to discuss joint education at the cadet level, but lost a great opportunity to discuss the joint professional development of our junior officers. If joint education at the cadet level is an important part of the overall joint education framework, why wasn't the primary level considered equally important? These conference proceedings support the author's assumption that a gap exists in the joint education framework --that gap is at the primary level.
In September 1998, branching from the Monterey conference, a new study emerged on the Not only did the above study spark this author's interest in this particular joint education
issue, it appears to be the first joint education study that seriously addressed the importance of educating junior officers. It specifically addressed the issue that the JPME system of the 21 st century will need to educate "all" of our officers in order to meet future challenges. It also addressed the importance of joint education at the junior officer level using the anticipated requirements of a JTF. As seen from the author's experience in Haiti, and the findings of this report, assignments to JTFs are usually provided from service headquarters by grade and specialty required without any consideration to their JPME background. This appears to be the first noteworthy study that makes a strong argument that there is a significant operational link between our future vision, JTFs, and junior officer joint edcuation. The team not only set out to define the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary for officers to perform effectively using Joint Vision 2010, but they also knew that the "joint education process must prepare officers, at all grade levels, to integrate quickly into JTFs." 18 Once again, JTFs are seen as the wave of the future. program could be found. The bottom-line is that senior leaders continue to recognize the need for a basic foundation of knowledge, but nothing seems to happen beyond that point. Other than requiring a tri-annual report from the services, it is unclear as to the enforcement priority JCS applies to its own primary level policies.
The above findings most relevant to this author's problem statement are as follows: "If we continue with ad hoc JTFs, junior officers need a fundamental knowledge of JTF operations and JPME should be a seamless system that is a part of an officer's professional development from precommissioning through CAPSTONE." 21 As stated earlier, the author found this study to be the most powerful supporter of joint education at the primary level. It sends a very powerful message that if the U.S. is going to maintain its future military readiness, in a progressively joint environment, we need more efficient, effective, and flexible joint education programs at all levels. In accordance with the OPMEP, each service operates its officer PME primarily to develop officers with the basic skills, knowledge, and abilities appropriate to the rank, branch, and warfare specialty. This chapter assesses the services' current JPME programs at their primary education level PME schools and compares them to the mandates of the OPMEP and the proposals present in the JPME 2010 Study. Although the OPMEP is over two years old, it must be understood that prior to its existence there was no requirement to include joint education in primary education level instruction. Any service data collected for this chapter was a result of the most current services' internet-homepages and email/phone interviews. For the purpose of adding credibility to the study, personnel interviewed gave permission to reference their office.
Notes
Even though the CJCS has overall responsibility for the education of our military, each service chief has the direct responsibility for training their force. Each service chief delegates the responsibility of all "schoolhouse" education to a respective education headquarters commanded by general officers. These headquarters have numerous subordinate commands that are each responsible for a particular type or level of education. With a certain level of 22 centralized control, decentralized execution, and different service cultures and strategic mission statements, it was not surprising that each has a unique educational hierarchy, PME framework, and primary education level education methods.
Before any attempt can be made at reviewing joint curriculum within each service, it is important to understand their education systems. Each of the following sections offer a brief understanding of a particular service's primary education level structure or hierarchy, as well as a review of current joint curriculum offered within. It is obviously that each service approaches the primary education level differently. Currently, TRADOC is working with CGSC's, DJMO to develop the necessary education.
Army
The leadership at TRADOC has tasked the Army's CGSC, the proponent for joint education matters, to provide an outline of a formal/uniformed education support plan that encapsulates joint learning areas required as common core instruction across all branches. The branch commandants would then be responsible to weave this plan into their respective branch primary level institutions. This endeavor was to begin in early 1998, but TRADOC delayed the process for a few months while JCS, J7 initiated a review of joint learning objectives earlier this year and subsequently kicked-off the JPME 2010 Study.
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The Army's CGSC, DJMO has just completed an education needs analysis that addresses
Army joint education at the precommissioning and primary levels and is in the process of developing specific education support plans. 4 When the specific task lists are developed, they will be incorporated into the TRADOC common core for instruction by all primary branch career courses with resources. These tasks will satisfy the minimum OPMEP JPME requirements and each individual branch commandant will be encouraged to include additional branch specific joint education tasks within their own resource capabilities. The leadership of TRADOC and CGSC hope to have this endeavor completed between March and June 1999.
The leadership of TRADOC released the following proposed joint task for its Officer Basic
Courses: Apply joint doctrine and capabilities pertinent to an operational mission for a platoon size unit assigned to a JTF. This task is broken down into the following subtasks:
"Identify the fundamental concepts of the JTF organization, command and control, employment, and operations; identify joint doctrine pertinent to the specific Army branch doctrine being taught; interpret integration of joint forces and Service systems supporting the tactical battlespace; identify other Services' systems which would be employed with Army systems being taught at that school; and finally, list the Army's contributions to the joint warfighting readiness."
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The leadership of TRADOC has also released the following proposed joint task title for its Captain Career Courses: Integrate joint doctrine and capabilities pertinent to an organizational mission for a company sized unit assigned to a JTF. This task is broken down into the following subtasks:
"List or integrate the fundamental concepts of a JTF organization, command and control, employment, and operations; identify joint doctrine relating to Army doctrine being taught and discuss the relationship between the two; analyze integration of joint and service systems supporting the tactical battlespace being taught at the school; analyze other service' weapons being taught at the school; and finally, assess the Army's contribution to joint warfighting readiness."
If incorporated into a formal program, each of the above ideas will satisfy the minimum requirements presented in the OPMEP and the proposals discussed in the recent JPME 2010
Study. Based on the information provided by the sources, the Army has recognized the need for joint education at the primary level and has developed a plan to incorporate it into formal primary level education programs. 
Air Force
Navy
The Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET), located at Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida, is responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for the education and training of Navy personnel. 9 The CNET oversees a network of training and education programs throughout the United States and on ships at sea. It is one of the largest Naval shore commands comprised of more than 170 subordinate commands and detachments coast to coast and in Hawaii. It offers education through more than 4,000 different courses at 30 bases. As an essential part of Naval readiness, CNET's education responsibility includes recruit education, specialized skills education, precommissioning education for officers, warfighting specialty education, and fleet individual and team education. 
Marines
The Marine Corps University (MCU), Quantico, Virginia, is responsible for developing, implementing, and monitoring all PME policies and programs for the Marine Corps and coordinating JPME with the JCS and other services. The President, MCU exercises operational control over all Marine Corps PME schools/colleges and is responsible directly to the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps. The MCU's Director, Operations and Policy Branch is directly responsible for developing and implementing PME and JPME for the President and coordinating the JPME programs. As stated earlier in the study, the OPMEP directed the services to implement joint education programs at the precommissioning and primary levels and required a report to the CJCS. The initial report was due by 1 October 1996, but was later changed to 1 October 1997. The MCU recognized their deficiencies and reported to the JCS that they would be corrected immediately.
13
In support of that, one of the key Marine Corps PME goals is to develop officers whose professional backgrounds and military education will improve the operational excellence of both single-service and joint military forces throughout the spectrum of war. Similar to the requirements established by the OPMEP, the Marine Corps' joint training end state at the primary level is to establish "joint awareness."
29
The Marine Corps reported in October 1997 that the requirements for primary joint education in the OPMEP were met through a building block approach. 14 
Conclusion
This study has presented the CJCS level requirements and guidance for joint education at the primary education level and findings in many supporting studies and documents that recognize the need for some type of joint education program within current primary level institutions. This research found very few comments that failed to support the need for joint education at the primary level. Additionally, it provides a broad review of the existing programs within our services' and examines highlights the professional development void that exist in our JPME framework.
This study presents a supported argument for developing and maintaining formal joint education programs at our services' primary level institutions. For the military to accept the notion that a serious study of joint education can be delayed until midway in an officer's career runs contrary to the proven developmental process and does not support the CJCS's, JV 2010.
Due to the challenges of developing a thorough understanding of the capabilities and missions of our services, joint education should not be postponed. We must progressively cultivate and 32 acquire our joint knowledge through a continuum of education throughout an officer's career.
This process supports our seriousness about becoming more joint oriented. There is no evidence that supports an argument that joint education at the primary level will detract from the critical service specialty education that officers must acquire to obtain service competency. The author understands that incorporating this curriculum to the services' programs will be a challenge, but believes that the value added will be significant. If the CJCS mandates the requirement, it is the author's firm belief that the service chiefs will make it happen. Joint education at the primary level will spark the interest of our junior officers early in their careers and will prepare them for the joint experiences anticipated in the future battlespace. 
Recommendations
Since our strategic environment is constantly changing, our strategic education plans must change as well. Junior officers will continue to play a primary role on a JTF staff or participate in a joint operation before the end of their first decade of service. Therefore, we must educate our junior officers beyond the context of their own service or warfare specialty. It's time to emphasize joint education at the primary level and eliminate the outdated thought that senior officers are the only ones that will ever be on joint duty. Over the years, the CJCS has worked diligently to implement many joint educational reforms demanded by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but it is time to shift emphasis to our junior officers. The author recommends that the CJCS reemphasize mechanisms to evaluate the services' compliance with his OPMEP in regards to joint education at the primary level. Evidence shows that the Air Force and Navy are not "doing the right thing for our future." They need to look to the Marine Corps and Army for advice.
Our joint future readiness requires it.
Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP): A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff published document that describes and mandates their objectives, policies, procedures, and standards supporting the JPME requirements for joint staff officer qualifications. Primary-level education or service schools: Includes institutions or levels of education that are designed for training Lieutenants/Ensign through Captain/Lieutenants of all services. Pre-commissioning: Used to refer to cadets in either ROTC or one of the service academies. Professional Military Education (PME): The systematic instruction designed to prepare military professionals to perform increasingly complex tasks as they progress in their military career. It is multidisciplinary instruction concerned with the military, political, economic, social, and psychological dimensions of national security. The emphasis is on the art and science of war; service organization; joint and combined organizations; employment and deployment concepts; and concepts and doctrine of military leadership. Program of Instruction: A series of related courses designed to satisfy a specific training requirement Senior-level education or service schools: Includes institutions or levels of education that are designed for training Colonels /Naval Captains. 
